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On March 23, 2010 President Barack Obama signed the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (hereinafter “ACA”) into law.1 
The enactment of the ACA was an enormous step in the history of 
the United States, as “no prior administration had successfully 
pushed national health reform through Congress, despite several at-
tempts.”2  The Act was created with the primary goal of providing all 
American citizens with quality, affordable healthcare while also estab-
lishing mechanisms to curb the unsustainable growth of healthcare 
costs in the United States.3 
In order to achieve one of its main objectives—the expansion of 
healthcare coverage to currently uninsured citizens—the ACA con-
tains provisions that extend Medicaid to all individuals earning less 
than 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL).4  The act also provides 
subsidies, through healthcare exchanges, to Americans earning be-
tween 133% and 400% of the FPL, without access to affordable em-
ployer-sponsored health insurance.5  The Congressional Budget Of-
fice estimates that these provisions, along with others such as the 
“minimal essential coverage provision” or “individual mandate,” will 
increase the number of individuals with coverage by thirty-two million 
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 1 Scott E. Harrington, U.S. Healthcare Reform:  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
77 J. RISK & INS. 703, 703 (2010). 
 2 Bradley W. Joondeph, Federalism and Healthcare Reform:  Understanding the States’ Challenges 
to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 41 J.FEDERALISM 447, 447 (2011). 
 3 James F. Freeley III, National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius:  The Constitu-
tionality of Healthcare Reform and the Spending Clause, 45 CONN. L. REV. 19, 21–22 (2013). 
 4 H.R. Con. Res. 3590, § 2001(a)(1)(C)(VIII), 111th Cong. (2011) (enacted); Federal Poverty 
Guidelines, FAMILIES USA, http://familiesusa.org/product/federal-poverty-guidelines 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2014) (stating that, as of February of 2014, the FPL is set at 
$11,670 for a single individual and $23,850 for a family of four). 
 5 Adam N. Hofer et al., Expansion of Coverage under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act and Primary Care Utilization, 89 MILBANK Q. 69, 69 (2011). 
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before the year 2019,6 with approximately seventeen million individ-
uals obtaining insurance through the Medicaid expansion.7 
Predictably, not all Americans were enthusiastic about the passage 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.8  Very soon after 
the ACA was signed into law, states began challenging the Act’s con-
stitutionality.9  Among these challenges, certain states contended that 
the ACA, which required states to expand Medicaid or lose all federal 
Medicaid funding, compelled them to implement a federal program 
in violation of both the Spending Clause and the Tenth Amend-
ment.10  Even though the language of the ACA is nonobligatory,11 the 
“importance of federal Medicaid funding in a typical state’s budget 
means that states have little choice but to implement the [ACA’s] 
changes to Medicaid.”12 
These constitutional challenges moved through the federal courts 
and were eventually resolved by the United States Supreme Court in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.13  In Sebelius, the 
Court upheld the ACA’s “individual mandate”14 but ruled that the 
Medicaid expansion violated the Spending Clause of the Constitution 
since states really had no choice but to accept the expanded Medi-
caid funding.15  Thus, the Court ruled, new federal expansion fund-
ing could be withheld from the states that do not expand Medicaid, 
but Medicaid funding already being provided could not be taken 
away.16  The Court’s decision in Sebelius effectively left the choice of 
whether to expand Medicaid entirely with the individual states.17  
While the Court’s decision in Sebelius may be viewed as a triumph of 
federalism, the decision has created potentially devastating problems 
for the ACA. 
 
 6 Id. at 70. 
 7 AM MED. ASS’N ADVOCACY RES. CTR., ISSUE BRIEF:  MEDICAID EXPANSION (2013), http://
www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/arc/medicaid-expansion-issue-brief.pdf. 
 8 Joondeph, supra note 2, at 447. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. at 448. 
 11 H.R. Con. Res. 3590, 111th Cong. (2011) (enacted) (describing a state as an expan-
sion state “if [ the state] offers health benefits coverage statewide to parents and 
nonpregnant, childless adults whose income is at least 100% of the poverty line.” 
Further, a state will not be considered an expansion state if the state only offers 
“health benefits coverage to parents or nonpregnant childless adults.”). 
 12 Joondeph, supra note 2, at 448. 
 13 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 14 Id. at 2600. 
 15 Id. at 2662–66. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
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As of February 18, 2015, twenty-two states had not yet decided 
whether they would expand Medicaid, with nineteen states leaning 
against expansion.18  The failure of these states to expand their Medi-
caid programs would leave approximately six million people, who 
were initially expected to gain coverage under the ACA, without any 
means of obtaining affordable healthcare.19  Thus, after Sebelius, se-
curing affordable, quality coverage for all Americans will likely not be 
possible. 
This Comment seeks to examine the alternative methods of a se-
lect group of states which have, or are considering, “opting-out” of 
the Medicaid expansion, plan to employ as a means of providing 
health coverage to their uninsured poor citizens.  The Comment will 
begin, in Part I, with a brief discussion of the ACA’s Medicaid Expan-
sion and the early state challenges to this provision’s constitutionality.  
Part II will contain a discussion of the Supreme Court’s resolution of 
these challenges in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius.  Parts III through V will then focus on the alternative pro-
grams proposed by Arkansas, Iowa, and Pennsylvania and whether 
these programs are an effective means of insuring low-income indi-
viduals.  Further, the propriety and fairness of certain states’ decision 
not to participate in the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, while also declin-
ing to negotiate an alternate plan through a § 1115 waiver,20 will be 
evaluated.  The Sebelius decision’s overall impact on the success of the 
ACA will also be discussed.  Finally, the Comment will conclude, in 
Part VI, with a discussion of “federalism by waiver” in the realm of 
cooperative federal and state programs in the aftermath of Sebelius. 
I. THE MEDICAID EXPANSION & STATES’ CHALLENGES 
Medicaid was created under Title XIX of the Social Security Act 
and became law in 1965 as a joint venture between the federal and 
 
 18 See Where  the  Stat es  Stand on  Medicaid  Expans ion:  28 States ,  D.C.  Expanding 
Medicaid , T H E  A D V I S O R Y  B D .  C O .  (Feb. 11, 2015 11:47 AM), http://www.
advisory.com/daily-briefing/resources/primers/medicaidmap 
 19 See KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,  FOCUS ON HEALTH REFORM:  A GUIDE TO THE SUPREME 
COURT’S DECISION ON THE ACA’S MEDICAID EXPANSION 3 (Aug. 2012), available at 
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8347.pdf. 
 20 Section 1115 Demonstrations, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-
Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/Section-1115-Demonstrations.html 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2014) (explaining that § 1115 demonstration waivers “give the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services authority to approve experimental, pilot, or 
demonstration projects that promote the objectives of the Medicaid and CHIP pro-
grams”). 
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state governments.21  Within a broad framework, established through 
the passage of federal statutes, regulations, and policies, “each State 
establishes its own eligibility standards; determines the type, amount, 
duration, and scope of services; sets the rate of payment for services; 
and administers its own program.”22  Medicaid was specifically de-
signed in this manner to give states extensive flexibility in adminis-
trating their particular Medicaid programs, and, as a result, there ex-
ists a great deal of variation in eligibility requirements, even among 
states of similar size or geographic location.23  Therefore, an individ-
ual who is eligible for Medicaid benefits in one state may not be eligi-
ble to receive those benefits in another state or may observe drastic 
differences in the “amount, duration, or scope of services provided.”24 
There are, however, federal guidelines that limit a state’s ability to 
deny Medicaid coverage to certain “categorically needy” groups of 
people or restrict the coverage of certain medical services.25  In order 
for a state to receive federal Medicaid funding, which comprises over 
20% of the average state’s total expenditures,26 a state is required to 
provide coverage to such groups.27  These groups with mandatory eli-
gibility include pregnant women, children, adults with dependent 
children, people with disabilities, and seniors.28 
There are also “medically needy” groups of individuals to which 
states have the option of extending coverage and will receive federal 
 
 21 BARBARA S. KLEES, CHRISTIAN J. WOLFE & CATHERINE A. CURTIS, DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, BRIEF 
SUMMARIES OF MEDICARE & MEDICAID:  TITLE XVIII AND TITLE XIX OF THE SOCIAL 
SECURITY ACT AS OF NOVEMBER 1, 2009, at 18 (Nov. 1, 2009), available at http://www.
cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Medicare
ProgramRatesStats/downloads/MedicareMedicaidSummaries2009.pdf. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 18, 23 (explaining that limited income families with children under age six 
whose family income is at or below 133% of the FPL, pregnant women whose family 
income is below 133% of the FPL, infants born to Medicaid-eligible women for the 
first year of life with certain restrictions, Supplemental Security Income Recipients, 
recipients of adoption or foster care assistance under Title IV-E of the Social Security 
Act, special protected groups, all children under age 19 in families with incomes at 
or below the FPL, and certain Medicare beneficiaries are all categorically needy). 
 26 CTR. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES & GEORGETOWN HEALTH POLICY INST., MEDICAID AND 
STATE BUDGETS: LOOKING AT THE FACTS 1–2 (Mar. 2011), avai lab l e  a t  http://ccf.
georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Medicaid%20and%
20state%20budgets-2011.pdf. 
 27 See KLEES, WOLFE & CURTIS, supra note 2 1 , at 18–20. 
 28 See DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAID AT-A-GLANCE 2005:  A MEDICAID 
INFORMATION SOURCE 1 (2005), available at http://downloads.cms.gov/cmsgov/archived-
downloads/MedicaidGenInfo/downloads/medicaidataglance2005.pdf. 
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matching funds for doing so.29  If, however, a state elects to extend 
coverage to the “medically needy,” there are federal requirements 
mandating that certain groups and certain services be included as 
part of such coverage.30 
Prior to the passage of the ACA, an individual would have to be-
long to one of the aforementioned “categorically needy” groups,31 or 
in certain states a “medically needy” group, and meet a state-
established financial test32 to qualify for Medicaid.  The income 
threshold for pregnant women and children was set by the federal 
government to be no less than 133% of the FPL.33  For other individ-
uals, however, that threshold can be, and in many states is, much low-
er.  For seventeen states, the Medicaid eligibility level for parents with 
dependent children was set at or below 50% of the FPL, which is 
$11,670 for a family of four.34  In another seventeen states, the Medi-
caid eligibility level for parents with dependent children was still set 
below 100% of the FPL, or $23,850 for a family of four.35  In states 
with more restrictive Medicaid programs, as many as 55% of individ-
uals living below 100% of the FPL are left without any form of health 
insurance.36 
As the ACA was written, almost every United States citizen under 
the age of sixty-five with an income below 133% of the FPL would 
qualify for Medicaid.  Further, the Act provides “that the federal gov-
ernment will pay 100% of the costs of covering these newly eligible 
individuals through 2016.”37  After that period expires, the federal 
government will gradually reduce its payment level to no lower than  
90%.38  Thus, the ACA anticipates very significant changes to the 
Medicaid programs of states with less generous Medicaid enrollment 
requirements. 
The Medicaid expansion is a crucial element of the ACA, as one 
of the Act’s primary goals is to achieve near universal helathcare cov-
erage in the United States.  After the ACA’s implementation, roughly 
 
 29 See KLEES, WOLFE & CURTIS, supra note 2 1 , at 20. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 18–20. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Medicaid and CHIP Eligibility Table by State, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
(2015) http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/medicaid-eligibility-table-by-state-state-
activist.aspx  
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012). 
 38 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1)(E) (2013). 
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thirty-two million people were expected to acquire affordable, quality 
health insurance.39  While these individuals are expected to obtain 
healthcare through a variety of the ACA’s provisions,40 nearly seven-
teen-million of the newly insured individuals were projected to gain 
coverage through the expansion of Medicaid.41  These provisions, 
which are largely just expansions and alterations of health insurance 
structures already in place in the United States, left policy makers 
very hopeful that universal healthcare coverage, thought to be crucial 
to the well-being of a citizenry in many nations, would finally be a re-
ality in the United States.42  This optimism was, however, short-lived.  
On March 23, 2011, the day President Obama signed the ACA into 
law, Florida and twelve other states brought a lawsuit that challenged 
the constitutionality of the ACA’s individual mandate and Medicaid 
expansion provisions.43  Thirteen other states, several individuals, and 
the National Federation of Independent Business subsequently 
joined these Plaintiffs.44 
In Florida ex. rel. Bondi v. United States Department of Health 
and Human Services, plaintiffs challenged “the fundamental and ‘mas-
sive’ changes in the nature and scope of the Medicaid program” as a 
violation of the Constitution’s Spending Clause.45  The plaintiffs ar-
gued that the expansion alters the Medicaid program to such an 
extent that states “cannot afford the newly-imposed costs and 
burdens” and that states will “have no choice but to remain in Med-
icaid as amended by the Act, which will eventually require them to 
‘run their budgets off a cliff.’”46  The District Court for the Northern 
District of Florida, in ruling that the defendant was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on the Medicaid expansion issue, held 
that the costs and burdens imposed on states participating in the 
 
 39 Emily Whelan Parento & Lawrence O. Gostin, Better Health, But Less Justice:  Widening 
Health Disparities After National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 27 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 481, 482 (2013). 
 40 For example, the elimination of insurer discrimination on the basis of pre-existing 
conditions and the creation of health insurance exchanges that pool risks.  The ex-
changes will allow individuals earning between 134 and 400% of the FPL, and who 
are unable to obtain quality employment based helathcare coverage, to purchase in-
surance at a reasonable price.  S e e  FOCUS ON HEALTH REFORM, supra note 1 9 , a t  2–
3. 
 41 Id. at 3. 
 42 See Parento & Gostin, supra note 3 9 ,  a t  4 8 2 .  
 43 See Fla. ex rel. Bondi v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1263 
(N.D. Fla. 2011). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 1266. 
 46 Id. 
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program were not in excess of the powers granted to Congress under 
the Spending Clause on a “coercion” theory, given that participation 
in the Medicaid program was voluntary, that states had an option to 
“opt out,” and that Congress, when it enacted the Medicaid program, 
had expressly reserved right to alter or amend it.47 
The plaintiffs in Bondi then appealed the district court’s deci-
sion to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.  In Florida ex. rel. 
Attorney General v. United States Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, the plaintiff states revived their argument that an additional 
restriction on Congress’s spending power, one that incorporates 
the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of certain powers to the states 
and prevents Congress from “employ[ing] the spending power in 
such a way as to ‘coerce’ the states into compliance with [a] federal 
objective,” should be added.48  While the Eleventh Circuit recognized 
that there is a point where restrictions on a state’s ability to 
use grants of federal funding could be so burdensome as to 
prevent the state from having any real choice but to participate in 
“optional” federal programs and thus rise to the level of coercion,49 
the court decided that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion was not undu-
ly coercive under relevant precedent.50  Florida ex. rel. Attorney General 
was not, however, the end of the matter.  Plaintiffs successfully peti-
tioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, and the Court agreed to re-
view the lowers courts’ decisions as to the constitutionality of both 
the Medicaid expansion and the individual mandate.51 
III. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS V. SEBELIUS 
Although all circuit courts were in agreement that the Medicaid 
expansion did not amount to coercion, and “[n]o lower court had 
declared the Medicaid expansion unconstitutional,”52 the United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
 
 47 Id. at 1268. 
 48 Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 
1264 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 49 Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1267. 
 50 Id. 
 51 See Fla. e x .  R e l .  A t t ’ y  G e n .  v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 6 4 8  F . 3 d  
1 2 3 5  ( 1 1 t h  C i r .  2 0 1 1 ) ,  c e r t  g r a n t e d ,  1 3 2  S .  C t .  6 0 4  ( 2 0 1 1 )  
( N o .  1 1 - 4 0 0 ) .  
 52 Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into Endless 
Difficulties:  Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 30 (2013). 
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A. The States’ Argument 
The States’ argument against the Medicaid expansion focused 
heavily on the perceived need to limit Congress’s spending power, as 
the Spending Clause is a means by which Congress can reach beyond 
its specifically enumerated powers.53  According to the States, “if this 
Medicaid expansion [does] not cross the line into coercion, ‘no Act 
of Congress ever will.’”54  Thus, the States’ challenges focused on the 
constitutionality of the expansion based on both the Spending 
Clause55 and the Tenth Amendment.56 
B. The United States’s Argument 
The United States first argued for the Medicaid expansion’s con-
stitutionality by citing Congress’s history of broad authority under the 
Spending Clause to “fix the terms on which it shall disburse federal 
money to the [S]tates.”57  The United States cited numerous instances 
where Congress has mandated expansions of categories of individuals 
and benefits covered by Medicaid.58  The United States then chal-
lenged the logic of the states’ coercion claim, which was based on the 
idea that the amount of federal funding that could be withheld from 
the states was so substantial as to leave the states with no choice but to 
participate in the expansion.59  The United States noted that Peti-
tioners’ argument would support the peculiar proposition that the 
Medicaid expansion would have been more coercive if Congress had 
instead opted to indefinitely fund all of its costs.60 
 
 53 See Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 52, at 40–41 (ci t ing Nat’l Fed’n of 
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,  2 64 2  (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part)) (recognizing that Congress has not unlimited spending 
power because of the power imbalance that can result from unlimited funding). 
 54 Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 52, at 32–33 (quoting Reply Brief of State 
Petitioners on Medicaid at 10, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012) (No. 11-393)).  The states argued that the ACA is coercive since Congress 
threatened to withhold all federal Medicaid funding from states unwilling to partici-
pate in the expansion and did not provide states with an alternative means of insur-
ing their low-income citizens. 
 55 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 56 U.S. CONST. amend X. 
 57 Brief for Respondents at 15, Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 132 S. Ct. 
2566 (2012) (No. 11-400) (hereinafter Brief for Respondents). 
 58 Id. at 26–27. 
 59 Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 52, at 35. 
 60 See Brief for Respondents, supra note 57, at 41 (arguing that had Congress decided to 
fund state Medicaid programs entirely, but conditioned their funding grant on ex-
pansion, the portion of funding withheld from non-expanding states would be im-
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C. The Supreme Court’s Plurality Opinion 
On June 28, 2012, roughly two years after President Barack 
Obama signed the ACA into law, a plurality of the Supreme Court, 
led by Chief Justice John Roberts, found the Medicaid expansion to 
be unconstitutionally coercive.61 
Chief Justice Roberts began his opinion by explaining that the 
Supreme Court has “long recognized that Congress may use [its pow-
er under the Spending Clause] to grant federal funds to the States, 
and may condition such a grant upon the States’ ‘taking certain ac-
tions that Congress could not [otherwise] require them to take.’”62  
This power implies that Congress can monitor the states’ use of fed-
eral funds to make sure they “provide for the . . . general Welfare”63 
in the manner Congress intended when it granted states the fund-
ing.64 
Chief Justice Roberts then cautioned that the Court has recog-
nized limits on Congress’s spending power when such power is used 
to secure state compliance with federal objectives, as “the Constitu-
tion has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability 
to require the States to govern according to Congress’[s] instruc-
tions.”65  If Congress’s spending power were not limited, federalism 
and thus individual liberty, could be compromised.66 
Chief Justice Roberts clarified that Spending Clause programs do 
not present a danger to federalism when states are given a legitimate 
choice whether to accept the federal conditions, so that holding state 
officials politically accountable for their decisions would be fair.67  
When, however, the state is left with no real choice but to accept the 
funding grant’s conditions, the federal government can avoid politi-
cal accountability while still accomplishing goals it could not accom-
plish directly through employment of its enumerated powers.68 
 
mense and would, according to the states’ logic, be significantly more coercive than 
the terms of the ACA’s expansion). 
 61 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,  2601–08 (2012) (assessing 
the constitutionality of  the ACA’s Medicaid expansion and finding it coercive, thereby 
violating the limits of the Spending Clause). 
 62 Id. at 2601 (quoting College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 
527 U.S. 666, 686 (1999)). 
 63 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 64 See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 65 Id. (internal citations omitted) ( quoting New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992)). 
 66 See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 67 Id. 
 68 See id. at 2603. 
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Applying this reasoning to the ACA’s Medicaid expansion provi-
sion, the Court held that the threatened loss of over 20% of the aver-
age state’s budget constituted the very threat to federalism that limits 
on Congress’s spending power are necessary to prevent.  Further, the 
United States’s argument that the expansion is merely a modification 
of the existing Medicaid program, which the States agreed Congress 
could alter when they “signed on in the first place,” was rejected.69  
Rather, the expansion “accomplishes a shift in kind, not merely de-
gree” since the Medicaid program under the ACA was transformed 
into a program designed to meet the healthcare needs of all individ-
uals earning below 133% of the FPL.70  Thus, Medicaid “is no longer a 
program to care for the neediest among us, but rather an element of 
a comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance 
coverage.”71 
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts held that, while “Congress is not 
free . . . to penalize States that choose not to participate in [the] new 
program by taking away their existing Medicaid funding,” the other 
reforms enacted by Congress under the ACA “will remain fully opera-
tive . . . and will still function in a way consistent with Congress’s basic 
objectives in enacting the statute.”72  This portion of the plurality 
opinion operated to save the ACA as a whole by rejecting the idea 
that the Medicaid expansion was necessary for the individual man-
date to function. 
While the Court may have saved the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act as a whole, the designation of the Medicaid expan-
sion as unconstitutional will likely operate to hamper the effective-
ness of the Act.  For the states that ultimately decide not to 
participate in the expansion, vulnerable citizens will be left without 
any means of obtaining affordable healthcare.  Thus, low state partic-
ipation in the expansion will directly counter the ACA’s objectives 
and leave large gaps in helathcare coverage throughout the United 
States.  Unless states are able to devise effective alternatives to ex-
panding their Medicaid programs, the ACA’s primary goal of provid-
ing quality healthcare to all Americans will likely prove infeasible. 
 
 69 Id. at 2605. 
 70 Id. at 2606. 
 71 Id.  
 72 Id. at 2607–08. 
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III. ALTERNATE STATE PLANS 
As of February 18, 2015, twenty-nine states and the District of Co-
lumbia had decided to participate in the ACA’s Medicaid expan-
sion.73  Fifteen states had declined to participate, and seven states—
Alaska, Missouri, Montana, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wyo-
ming—are presently undecided.74  Unfortunately, many of the states 
that have decided not to expand Medicaid are amongst the least gen-
erous in terms of their Medicaid eligibility requirements.75 
For seventeen states, most of which have decided not to partici-
pate in the expansion, Medicaid eligibility levels for parents with de-
pendent children were set at or below 50% of the FPL.76  In another 
seventeen states that have also largely declined participation or are 
undecided eligibility levels for parents with dependent children were 
set below 100% of the FPL.77  And, in almost all of these states, enrol-
lees must belong to certain categorical groups to be eligible for Med-
icaid.78  Thus, childless adults without disabilities are almost entirely 
ineligible for Medicaid’s assistance. 
There may, however, be a viable alternative to expanding Medi-
caid according to the ACA’s terms.  This alternative, which a handful 
of states have pursued, involves negotiation with the federal govern-
ment so that states can use Medicaid funding to provide healthcare to 
their low-income citizens without enrolling them directly in Medi-
caid.79  his Part seeks to examine the select group of states that have 
decided to provide healthcare for low-income citizens on terms that 
are different from those of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. 
 As of February 18, 2015, Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, and 
Pennsylvania have all proposed using federal Medicaid funds to pur-
 
 73 Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://
kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-
care-act/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2015). 
 74 Id. 
 75 See generally A N N E T T E  B .  R A M I R E Z  D E  A R E L L A N O  &  S I D N E Y  M .  
W O L F E ,  PUB. CITIZEN HEALTH RESEARCH GRP., UNSETTLING SCORES:  A RANKING OF 
STATE MEDICAID PROGRAMS 19 (2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
2007UnsettlingScores.pdf. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 MaryBeth Musumeci, Medicaid Expansion Through Marketplace Premium Assistance, KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND. (Sept. 17, 2013), http://kff.org/medicaid/fact-sheet/medicaid-
expansion-through-marketplace-premium-assistance/ (explaining that premium assis-
tance proposals are a means by which states can retain federal Medicaid funding, but 
use such funding to provide private health insurance to newly eligible Medicaid en-
rollees under the ACA). 
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chase private coverage for individuals who would be newly eligible for 
Medicaid under the ACA.80  All of these states have had their § 1115 
demonstration waivers81 approved by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, but Pennsylvania’s newly elected governor may opt 
for a state plan amendment.82  The Arkansas, Iowa, and Pennsylvania 
plans are discussed more fully in the following Parts.  The alternate 
plans of Indiana and Michigan, while containing some differences, 
are substantially similar to the state plans described below. 
A. The Arkansas Plan 
On September 27, 2013, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services notified Arkansas state officials that it had approved Arkan-
sas’ alternate expansion plan.83  Arkansas applied for a § 1115 waiver 
so that the roughly 200,000 Arkansas citizens who became eligible for 
Medicaid under the ACA could purchase individual plans from the 
healthcare marketplace, rather than being enrolled in the state’s 
Medicaid program.84 
Section 1115 of the Social Security Act gives the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services “wide latitude”85 to approve experi-
mental, pilot, or demonstration projects that promote the objectives 
of the Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance programs.86  Spe-
 
 80 Robin Rudowitz, Samantha Artiga & MaryBeth Musumeci, The ACA and Recent Section 
1115 Medicaid Demonstration Waivers, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/medicaid/issue-
brief/the-aca-and-recent-section-1115-medicaid-demonstration-waivers/ (last visited Feb. 15, 
2015). 
 81 Section 1115 Demonstrations, supra note 20 (explaining that “Section 1115 of the Social 
Security Act gives the Secretary of Health and Human Services authority to approve 
experimental, pilot, or demonstration projects that promote the objectives of the 
Medicaid and CHIP programs.  The purpose of these demonstrations, which give 
States additional flexibility to design and improve their programs, is to demonstrate 
and evaluate policy approaches.”). 
 82 Robin Rudowitz, Samantha Artiga, and Marybeth Musumeci, The ACA and Medicaid Ex-
pansion Waivers, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-aca-and-
medicaid-expansion-waivers/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2015); Kate Giammarise, Wolf Begins 
Dismantling Healthy PA in Favor of Medicaid, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 9, 2015), 
http://www.post-gazette.com/local/region/2015/02/09/Wolf-announces-plans-to-
revamp-states-Medicaid-plan/stories/201502090152. 
 83 Sarah Kliff, Arkansas is Using This Weird Trick to Expand Medicaid, WASH. POST WONKBLOG 
( Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/09 /
27/arkansas-is-using-this-weird-trick-to-expand-medicaid/. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Theodore W. Ruger, Health Policy Devolution and the Institutional Hydraulics of the Affordable 
Care Act,  in THE HELATHCARE CASE:  THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS, 367 (Nathaniel Persily, Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison eds., 
2013). 
 86 Section 1115 Demonstrations, supra note 20.  
Apr. 2015] NFIB’S IMPACT ON STATE MEDICAID 1237 
 
cifically, § 1115 provides that “the Secretary may waive compliance 
with any of the requirements of [the Act] to the extent and for the 
period he finds necessary to enable a state to carry out any experi-
mental, pilot, or demonstration project which the Secretary believes 
is likely to assist in promoting the objectives of the Act.”87  These 
§ 1115 demonstrations must be budget-neutral so that federal Medi-
caid expenditures do not exceed federal spending absent the waiv-
er.88  In Arkansas, the alternate expansion program is not expected 
to cost the federal government any more than a traditional expan-
sion, and the alternate program is set to continue for three years.89  
When the agreement expires, either the Centers for Medicaid and 
Medicare Services (“CMS”) or Arkansas can decide whether it would 
like to renew the premium assistance program.90 
The Arkansas plan will cover all newly eligible Medicaid benefi-
ciaries between the ages of nineteen and sixty, parents earning be-
tween 17% and 138% of the FPL, and childless adults earning be-
tween 0% and 138% of the FPL.91  For these individuals, enrollment 
in the premium assistance program will be mandatory.92 
 The medically frail93 will be exempt from the program but may 
opt in if they choose.94  Under the Arkansas plan, wraparound bene-
fits, which supplement private insurance plans that offer fewer bene-
 
 87 Ruger, supra note 85 (internal quotations omitted). 
 88 See Musumeci, supra note 79 (discussing the requirement of cost-effectiveness in premium 
assistance programs). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Kliff, supra note 83. 
 91 See Musumeci, supra note 79, a t  Fig. 2 (showing the eligible Medicaid beneficiaries 
for the Arkansas plan); Medicaid Expansion in Arkansas, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
http://kff.org/medicaid/fact-sheet/medicaid-expansion-in-arkansas/ (last visited Mar. 
28, 2015) 
 92 See Musumeci, supra note 79 (explaining that because Arkansas and the other states 
following the premium assistance model have made enrollment mandatory, 1115 
waivers are necessary before the plans can be implemented). 
 93 See 42 C.F.R. §  440.315(f) (2013) (allowing the states to define medically frail but 
mandating that the category include “ children with serious emotional disturbances, 
individuals with disabling mental disorders, individuals with serious and complex 
medical conditions, and individuals with physical and/or mental disabilities that sig-
nificantly impair their ability to perform one or more activities of daily living”); see 
also KRISTEN JENSEN & NANCY KIRCHNER, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
MEDICAID HIGHLIGHTS OF THE FINAL RULE:  ALTERNATIVE BENEFIT PLANS AND ESSENTIAL 
HEALTH BENEFITS 11 (July 9, 2013), available at http://www.medicaid.gov/State-
Resource-Center/Eligibility-Enrollment-Final-Rule/Alternative-Benefit-Plans-and-
Essential-Health-Benefits.pdf (explaining that people with substance abuse disorders 
are included in the definition of medically frail). 
 94 See Musumeci, supra note 79 (explaining how the medically frail will be exempt from the 
program unless they opt in). 
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fits than Medicaid, will be provided on a fee-for-service basis.95  Fur-
ther, Arkansas anticipates developing a pilot project with health sav-
ings accounts for new beneficiaries in 2015 and 2016.96  The state also 
plans to amend its waiver to extend coverage to parents earning less 
than 17% of the FPL, and to children, by the year 2016.97 
 Individuals who qualify for Arkansas’s premium assistance plan 
will be able to choose between at least two “high value silver level” 
quality health plans in the marketplace.98  If qualified individuals do 
not choose a plan, one will be assigned to them, and automatically as-
signed enrollees will then have thirty days to change their plan.99  Au-
tomatic assignment will be based on “target minimum market shares” 
of beneficiaries in each quality health program in the applicable re-
gion.100 
Arkansas will pay monthly premiums directly to the quality health 
plans for premium assistance enrollees, and beneficiaries will not be 
responsible for any premium costs.101  Beneficiaries will, however, be 
responsible for cost sharing of up to 5% of their annual income.102  
For beneficiaries earning between 100% and 138% of the FPL, cost-
sharing will be consistent with Medicaid and marketplace quality 
health plan rules.103  There will be no cost-sharing for beneficiaries 
earning below 100% of the FPL in 2014, but Arkansas’s waiver appli-
cation indicates that cost-sharing for individuals earning between 
50% and 100% of the FPL will be introduced in 2015 and 2016.104 
There will be no cost sharing for individuals who are exempted 
under federal Medicaid law.105  Individuals enrolled in a quality 
health plan under Arkansas’s premium assistance program will re-
ceive health benefits identical to those received by Arkansas citizens 
enrolled in the state’s Medicaid program.106 
 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
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B. The Iowa Plan 
Iowa’s § 1115 waiver was approved on December 10, 2013.107  The 
state’s premium assistance plan will cover newly eligible Medicaid 
beneficiaries earning between 100% and 138% of the FPL who do 
not have cost-effective employer-sponsored insurance.108  Beneficiaries 
earning up to 100% of the FPL will be covered through Medicaid 
managed care arrangements approved under another § 1115 demon-
stration.109  As in Arkansas, enrollment in a quality health plan will be 
mandatory for all § 1115 demonstration beneficiaries with an excep-
tion for the medically frail.110  American Indians and Alaskan natives 
can also voluntarily opt-out of the premium assistance program.111 
Premium assistance beneficiaries will choose between at least two 
silver level plans in the healthcare marketplace and may choose from 
all silver plans available in their geographic region.112  Further, the 
§ 1115 waiver quality health plans must offer 100% actuarial value.113  
This means that the plan must cover 100% of an enrollee’s 
healthcare expenses, even though silver plans for individuals not eli-
gible to participate in Iowa’s premium assistance program will have 
an actuarial value of only 70%.114  Once enrolled in a quality health 
plan, premium assistance enrollees must remain enrolled for twelve 
months.115 
Unlike beneficiaries in Arkansas, who pay no premiums, all pre-
mium assistance beneficiaries in Iowa will pay monthly premiums that 
cannot exceed 2% of their annual household income.116  These pre-
miums “will be waived for the first year of enrollment and may be 
waived in subsequent years if beneficiaries complete specified ‘health 
improvement activities.’”117  Beneficiaries will have a ninety-day grace 




109 See id. (stating a category of individuals that will be covered through the Medicaid 





114 Focus on Health Reform:  What the Actuarial Values in the Affordable Care Act Mean, KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND. (April 2011), http://kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/what-the-
actuarial-values-in-the-affordable/ (describing actuarial values for different tiers of cov-
erage, including a silver plan with a 70% actuarial value). 
115 See Musumeci, supra note 79 (stating the amount of time that premium assistance en-
rollees must remain enrolled). 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
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terminated.118  As in Arkansas, there will be cost sharing for benefi-
ciaries limited to 5% of annual income.119  There will also be copays 
for Iowa beneficiaries who rely on emergency rooms for non-
emergency purposes.120 
The benefits provided to premium assistance enrollees must “be 
at least equivalent to state employee plan benefits package[s].”121  
Further, in Iowa, dental benefits will be provided to enrollees 
“through a capitated commercial dental plan carve-out.”122 
C. The Proposed Pennsylvania Plan 
Former Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Corbett submitted a 
§ 1115 waiver application on February 19, 2014.123  The proposal, 
which spans over 100 pages, was approved on August 28, 2014.124  
Pennsylvania’s demonstration, like the approved § 1115 waiver pro-
grams in Arkansas, Iowa, Indiana, and Michigan, would use federal 
funds to cover citizens through the marketplace created under the 
ACA rather than expanding state Medicaid rolls.125  The “Healthy 
Pennsylvania”126 plan would cover all newly eligible Medicaid benefi-
ciaries between the ages of twenty-one and sixty-four and all parents 
earning between 33% and 138% of the FPL.127  Newly eligible nine-
teen and twenty year olds would be covered through Medicaid man-
aged care.128  The plan provides essential health benefits based on 
the small group plan with the largest enrollment benchmark.129 
As in Arkansas and Iowa, enrollment in private health insurance is 
mandatory for all Pennsylvania citizens who qualify, with the medical-







123 Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, Medical Assistance Bulletin (Nov. 4, 2014), available at http://
www.dpw.state.pa.us/cs/groups/webcontent/documents/bulletin_admin/c_116644.pdf. 
124 Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, Healthy Pennsylvania 1115 Demonstration Application 
(Feb. 2014), available at http://www.dpw.state.pa.us/cs/groups/webcontent/documents/
document/c_071204.pdf. 
125 See Musumeci, supra note 79. 
126 Thomas Corbett, Healthy PA:  Access, Affordability, Quality (Apr. 3, 2014), available at 
http://www.pennsylvaniaoralhealth.org/important-articles-pages/2014/4/3/healthy-pa-
access-affordability-quality. 
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quirement in Pennsylvania mandating that all “able-bodied” adults 
register with the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and actively en-
gage in work search or job training activities.131  Furthermore, in or-
der to maintain Medicaid eligibility, enrollees are required to com-
plete twelve approved work search activities during the first six 
months of enrollment.132  The approved Healthy Pennsylvania plan 
includes premiums for enrollees on an income-based sliding scale.133  
The premiums can, however, be reduced by a maximum of 50% if 
enrollees engage in certain “healthy behavior and work search activi-
ties.”134  Enrollees in the Healthy Pennsylvania plan face termination 
of benefits if premiums remain unpaid for three consecutive 
months.135  Cost sharing is also required for all non-emergency use of 
the emergency room.136 
IV. EVALUATION 
The premium assistance plans will likely provide non-expanding 
states with the same benefits realized by expanding states, while still 
furthering the objectives of the ACA.  Although the Arkansas, Iowa, 
Indiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania plans are not technically Medi-
caid expansions, since individuals will be directed to the marketplace 
rather than enrolled directly in Medicaid, the overall effect on health 
insurance coverage will be substantially the same. 
For states like Tennessee and Wyoming, which view the ACA’s 
Medicaid expansion as politically infeasible, but are looking for ways 
to provide healthcare to the vulnerable residents, the premium assis-
tance plans may be a viable option.137  The market-based premium as-
sistance plans have a much greater degree of acceptance among Re-
publican lawmakers who oppose expanding traditional Medicaid 
programs but are willing to pursue a free-market approach to 
helathcare.138  Further, since CMS has already demonstrated a will-
ingness to allow states to experiment with premium assistance plans 








137 Christine Vestal, More States Lean Toward Medicaid Expansion, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 28, 
2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/28/states-medicaid-expansion_n_
6563586.html.  
138 See Premium Assistance in Medicaid, HEALTH AFFAIRS (June 6, 2013), 
http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=94. 
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vulnerable populations obtain health coverage in states opposed to 
the ACA’s expansion.139 
The premium assistance plans also have benefits beyond political 
acceptance by conservative lawmakers.140  First, since the plans pro-
vide newly eligible beneficiaries with commercial insurance, plan en-
rollees may have access to primary care physicians, specialists, and 
hospitals that do not participate in the Medicaid program.141  Further, 
providing commercial health coverage rather than coverage through 
Medicaid “could allow people whose incomes fluctuate to more easily 
move from full Medicaid to a federally subsidized policy.”142  “Cur-
rently, many patients face gaps and variation in their coverage as 
changes in their income force them in and out of Medicaid and the 
private insurance market.”143 
A study done by George Washington University found that indi-
viduals who retained Medicaid coverage for a year paid approximate-
ly $333 a month in Medicaid bills.144  Patients who remained covered 
for only one month, however, paid roughly $625 a month.145  Thus, in 
the absence of continuity of coverage, individuals are “less likely to 
get the preventive care and chronic disease management they need 
to stay healthy and keep costs down.”146  Under a premium assistance 
model, the same carrier may offer Medicaid and commercial health 
coverage plans with the same network of doctors and hospitals.147  
Thus, the discontinuity of care that can lead to increased costs could 
be largely eliminated.  Such an approach can also lead to administra-
tive savings for states since individuals will not need to enroll in a 
plan with a different provider network if their income rises.148 
Finally, commercial coverage for newly eligible enrollees could 
“jumpstart competition among commercial insurance carriers and 
give states more sway over these companies and medical providers 
 
139 Id. 
140 Christine Vestal, Obama Administration Poised to Approve Arkansas-Style Medicaid Expansions, 









147 See id. (“If Medicaid beneficiaries can enroll in an exchange plan up front, they won’t 
have to move into a plan with a different provider network if their income rises.”). 
148 Id.  
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who serve Medicaid patients and other low-income adults.”149  This is 
because the new exchanges may be able to “aggregate the purchasing 
power of individuals and small groups and extend system reforms be-
yond Medicaid.”150 
These premium assistance plans may not, however, be cost effec-
tive for participating states initially.  The Congressional Budget Office 
estimated that providing Medicaid coverage to the newly insured 
would “cost about $6,000 per year per person.”151  Commercial insur-
ance coverage, purchased through the healthcare marketplace, will 
cost almost $9,000 per person on average.152 
Since the federal and state governments pay providers directly 
under traditional Medicaid programs and have a large network with 
which they can negotiate fees, private insurers traditionally pay pro-
viders much more than Medicaid for services.153  Since the § 1115 
waivers mandate that the premium assistance demonstration models 
not cost the federal government more than traditional Medicaid pro-
grams,154 premium assistance states will be paying more to provide 
coverage for newly eligible Medicaid beneficiaries than states partici-
pating in the ACA’s expansion directly.155 
However, as the share of the expansion funding granted to the 
states by the federal government is reduced and predicted cost shifts 
are realized, the premium assistance plans may become more compa-
rable to the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.156  The overall cost of private 
insurance and Medicaid are predicted to converge over time under 
the ACA as “[i]nsurance companies interested in competing for new-
ly eligible Medicaid beneficiaries and for low-income individuals pur-
chasing policies on the exchange may be willing to lower their pric-
es.”157  The addition of millions of individuals to the Medicaid 
program may also force states to increase the rates they pay 
healthcare providers “to convince more doctors, dentists, pharma-
 
149 Vestal, supra note 140. 
150 Premium Assistance in Medicaid, supra note 138, at 4. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Edwin Park, Expanding Medicaid a Less Costly Way to Cover More Low-Income Uninsured Than 
Expanding Private Insurance, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (June 26, 2008), 
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=429. 
154 See Musumeci, supra note 79 (detailing federal restrictions on costs and premium im-
position). 
155 See Park, supra note 153 (describing the cost savings of the ACA relative to Medicaid 
through lower reimbursement rates and reduced administrative costs). 
156 See Vestal, supra note 140 (describing the possibility of increased state costs as contri-
butions increase). 
157 Id. 
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cists, and hospitals to serve the new patients.”158  Further, before these 
predicted changes take place, premium assistance states might be 
able to “offset cost increases with savings that may come when people 
can more easily move from Medicaid to subsidized insurance on the 
exchange.”159  Increased competition may also act to lower costs as 
more individuals purchase insurance on the marketplace.160 
The question of states’ premium assistance models’ workability 
beyond their respective trial periods still remains.  As per the terms of 
the ACA, the federal government will begin reducing its contribution 
to expanded state Medicaid programs after three years.161  Federal 
approval of any § 1115 waiver requires that demonstration models 
not cost the federal government more than traditional Medicaid pro-
grams.162 
Therefore, states may have trouble renewing their premium assis-
tance agreements once federal funding contributions to the expand-
ing states drops below 100%.  If the cost saving predictions are real-
ized,163 and private insurance costs begin converging with the cost of 
Medicaid, continuation of state premium assistance models will likely 
be feasible.  If such predictions are inaccurate or slow to occur,164 the 
models will likely need to be reconsidered as states may be financially 
unable to continue using the reduced federal subsidies to purchase 
private insurance for their low-income, newly Medicaid eligible citi-
zens. 
Another concern regarding the premium assistance models is that 
the alternate approach does not necessarily mean that low-income 
individuals will obtain benefits equivalent to those they would have 




160 See id. (“The agency [HHS] also told states that increased competition in exchanges 
would occur because of the newly eligible enrollees, and that could result in lower pric-
es.”). 
161 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1) (prescribing that the federal government will reduce its con-
tribution to 95% for calendar quarters in 2017, 94% for calendar quarteres in 2018, 
93% for calendar quarters in 2019, and 90% for calendar quarters in 2020 and into fu-
ture years). 
162 See Musumeci, supra note 79 (finding that premium assistance programs must be “cost-
effective” as compared to the Medicaid state plan). 
163 See Vestal, supra note 140 (“Experts say, however, that the costs of private insurance 
and Medicaid are likely to converge over time.”). 
164 See id. 
165 Stanton R. Mehr & Mary K. Caffrey, New Approaches to Medicaid Expansion:  Hybrid Plans 
Offer Alternatives for Covering More People, A M .  J .  MANAGED CARE (Dec. 16, 2013), 
http://www.ajmc.com/publications/ebrc/2013/novdecem13/new-approaches-to-
medicaid-expansion-hybrid-plans-offer-alternatives-for-covering-more-people. 
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mandates that certain essential benefits be provided to all Medicaid 
enrollees, but states using premium assistance models are not adding 
citizens to their Medicaid roles.  CMS has, however, addressed this is-
sue in both Arkansas and Iowa by requiring that those states provide a 
form of “wrap around” coverage to ensure that citizens receiving cov-
erage under the premium assistance models obtain the same benefits 
as an individual enrolled in Medicaid.166  Furthermore, CMS has re-
quired that enrollees under a premium assistance model be given a 
choice between at least two silver plans in the marketplace.167  The 
question of adequacy of coverage is, therefore, unlikely to be an issue 
should other states decide to create their own premium assistance 
models, as CMS has already expressed its unwillingness to approve 
plans that offer enrollees fewer benefits than they would receive un-
der a traditional Medicaid program.168 
Although Medicaid benefit packages can vary tremendously from 
state to state, as the use § 1115 waivers in the past has led to variations 
in basic state Medicaid benefit packages,169 evidence from Arkansas 
and Iowa shows that CMS will likely prevent premium assistance 
models from acting to further increase benefit discrepancies among 
states.  The Department of Health and Human Services has also been 
working with states to add additional premium payments to exchange 
plans so that states pursuing a premium assistance model can simply 
add on the required services to the traditional exchange package of 
benefits.170  This will allow states to comply more easily with § 1115 
waiver requirements. 
V. STATES NOT EXPANDING 
While there may be both expected and unexpected difficulties 
surrounding Arkansas, Iowa, Indiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania’s 
premium assistance plans, these states, along with those that have de-
cided to expand their Medicaid programs in accordance with the 
ACA, will have their most vulnerable citizens insured.  For states that 
 
166 Id. 
167 See Park, supra note 153 (“Beneficiaries choose between at least two silver level Mar-
ketplace QHPs and may choose among all silver plans available in geographic re-
gion.”). 
168 Medicaid Expansion Through Premium Assistance:  Arkansas, Iowa, and Pennsylvania’s Proposals 
Compared, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 2014), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.
wordpress.com/2014/04/8463-04-medicaid-expansion-through-premium-assistance-
arkansas-iowa-and-pennsylvania.pdf. 
169 See Ruger, supra note 85, at 367 (detailing the vast number of such waivers in the 1990s 
and 2000s from the perspective of the federal government). 
170 Premium Assistance in Medicaid, supra note 138. 
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have chosen not to participate in the expansion and have no plans to 
develop their own premium assistance models, hundreds of thou-
sands of state citizens will remain without sufficient health insur-
ance.171 
As previously noted, this substantial gap in coverage could greatly 
reduce the effectiveness of the ACA.  In non-expanding states, the 
poorest adults would remain covered by Medicaid, but to significantly 
variable degrees of eligibility.172  Some states, for example, provide 
Medicaid coverage for adults only up to 17% of the FPL while other 
states provide coverage up to, and in some states beyond, 133%.173  
These significant “donut hole” gaps will make universal coverage 
nearly impossible, as the poorest citizens are statutorily exempt from 
the individual mandate and without the financial means to purchase 
health insurance on the marketplace.174 
Further, the ACA provides that only individuals earning between 
100% and 400% of the FPL will be eligible for tax credits if they pur-
chase health insurance through the marketplace.175  For states with 
the least generous income thresholds for pre-ACA Medicaid eligibil-
ity, a significant portion of poor citizens will be left “with neither a 
government healthcare program nor government assistance to pur-
chase private health insurance.”176  This gap will undoubtedly raise 
questions of equity and fairness, as similarly situated individuals in 
different states receive widely disparate treatment in terms of 
healthcare availability. 
It might be argued that individuals left without health coverage in 
non-expanding states could petition their state-elected officials or use 
the political process to elect new representatives.  Federalism’s politi-
cal accountability may, however, be lost due to the ACA’s blend of 
federal and state involvement in the Act’s implementation.177  Thus, 
citizens in non-expanding states may place the blame for their lack of 
coverage on the federal government rather than the state officials 
 
171 See FOCUS ON HEALTH REFORM, supra note 19. 
172 See Ruger, supra note 85 (stating that § 1115 of the Social Security Act allows for such 
varying degrees of eligibility among the states). 
173 See generally R A M I R E Z  D E  A R E L L A N O  &  W O L F E ,  supra note 75. 
174 See Huberfeld et al., supra note 52 at 85 (finding that the “donut hole” exists in light of 
the Supreme Court declaring that the Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care 
Act was unconstitutional). 
175 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 36(B). 
176 Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 52, at 86. 
177 See id. (“One apparent political goal of the tax-credit challenge is to deny coverage to mil-
lions of additional people, while laying the blame for ACA’s failures on the federal tax 
code rather than state officials who opt out of Medicaid expansion or a state exchange.”). 
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who elected to opt-out of the Medicaid expansion.  Low-income citi-
zens in non-expanding states may, therefore, become even more ex-
posed than  they were prior to the ACA’s implementation and have 
no real means of expressing their grievances through the political 
process.178 
Non-expanding states may also face serious financial detriments 
for declining to participate in the expansion.  First, federal taxes tak-
en from states that have decided not to expand Medicaid will be used 
to fund the expansion in other states.179  A study done by the Com-
monwealth Fund found that every state that does not participate in 
the Medicaid expansion would see a net loss in federal funds by the 
year 2022.180  For example, if Texas ultimately decides not to partici-
pate in the Medicaid expansion, the state will forgo “an estimated 
$9.58 billion in federal funding by 2022.”181  When the amount of 
federal taxes paid by Texas residents is taken into account, “the net 
cost to taxpayers in the state in 2022 will be more than $9.2 billion.”182  
Similarly, Florida taxpayers would loose more than five billion dollars, 
Georgia taxpayers nearly $4.9 billion and South Dakota taxpayers ap-
proximately $224 million.183  The citizens in non-expanding states 
will, therefore, be paying taxes without receiving any of the benefits 
that states participating in the expansion, or a premium assistance 
plan, receive. 
Increases in federal funding also create direct benefits by bolster-
ing state economies and providing the means necessary for better-
ment projects.184  Thus, even if a given state does not value “the 
health and health system benefits” of expanding Medicaid, the state 
should value the expansion “as a source of [funding] that benefits 
the state’s economy.”185 
Further, hospitals in states that have decided not to expand will 
lose federal funding meant to offset the cost of treating uninsured 
patients, since all citizens were expected to gain health insurance un-
 
178 See id. (Noting that under the ACA, “low-income individuals in Medicaid opt-out states 
with federal exchanges will be even more exposed”). 
179 See Sherry Glied & Stephanie Ma, How States Stand to Gain or Lose Federal Funds by Opting 
In or Out of the Medicaid Expansion, COMMONWEALTH FUND 1, 2 (Dec. 2013). 
180 See id. at 4 (“In every case, choosing not to participate in the [Medicaid] expansion 




184 See id. at 3 (arguing that such funds provide greater flexibility in state budgets by subsi-
dizing Medicaid costs and allowing that money to be spent on other public works pro-
jects). 
185 Id. 
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der the ACA.  These Disproportionate Share Hospital (“DHS”) pro-
grams, which pay out about $22 billion annually, will be reduced by 
nearly $18.1 billion between 2014 and 2020.186  Low-income individu-
als, who are statutorily exempt from the individual mandate, will re-
main uninsured absent affordable state subsidized health insurance, 
and remain the “primary beneficiaries of uncompensated hospital 
care.”187  This means that “hospitals in non-expansion states . . . could 
face substantial erosion of DSH funds despite seeing little or no 
change in the amount of uncompensated care they provide.”188  To 
recoup the loss of DSH funds, “hospitals could seek 
to . . . [limit] . . . uncompensated care or, most likely, pass nontrivial 
costs on to the privately insured.”189  Thus, non-expanding states will 
likely leave a significant uncompensated-care burden on hospitals. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE AND “FEDERALISM BY WAIVER” 
As the preceding Part articulates, § 1115 waivers can clearly bene-
fit both the federal and state governments.  In fact, the overall success 
of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion may depend on negotiations be-
tween state and federal actors.  However, the implications of this sys-
tem of “federalism by waiver”190 reach far beyond the provisions of 
the ACA.  Many scholars debate the propriety of allowing states to 
negotiate the terms of cooperative spending programs and it is clear 
that this debate will only increase in the wake of Sebelius.  National Fed-
eration of Independent Business v. Sebelius represents the first time the 
Supreme Court has struck down federal legislative action taken pur-
suant to the Spending Clause on Tenth Amendment grounds.191  Pre-
viously, the Court has made “little effort . . . to protect the states when 
Congress uses its power under the Spending Clause to influence state 
affairs.”192  This is likely due to the fact that federal legislatures could 
“point to the state’s voluntary decision to accept the funds” as indica-
 
186 See James A. Graves, Medicaid Expansion Opt-Outs and Uncompensated Care, 3 6 7  NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 2 3 6 5 ,  2 3 6 5  (2012), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/
NEJMp1209450. 
187 See id. at 2366. 
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189 Id. at 2367. 
190 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Healthcare Case:  The Supreme Court’s Decision and Its Implica-
tions, (University of Michigan Public Law and Legal  Theory  Research Paper Series, 
Paper No. 294, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2161599. 
191 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (holding that the 
Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act is unconstitutional). 
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1420 (1994). 
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tive of the states’ acceptance of federal legislative action.193  The 
Sebelius Court, as previously noted, found the states’ ability to make a 
“voluntary decision” lacking under the ACA’s Medicaid expansion 
and therefore held that the provision was unconstitutionally coer-
cive.194  The Supreme Court’s attempt to safeguard the federal model 
protected under the Tenth Amendment may, however, have unfore-
seen consequences for joint federal and state programs as waiver ap-
plications rise.  The Sebelius holding is likely to provide states with 
significantly greater bargaining power in the realm of cooperative 
federal-state programs due to an increase in waiver applications.195  In 
fact, the § 1115 waivers that have been approved, or are being con-
sidered, by CMS provide a clear example of increased state leverage 
when negotiating with the federal government. 
When, as with the ACA’s Medicaid expansion,196 “federal funding 
conditions are phrased in highly discretionary terms,” an administra-
tion can be expected to grant more waivers—especially when such 
waivers “serve [the administration’s] substantive policy prefer-
ences.”197 
An administration’s policy preferences are not, however, the only 
crucial variable.198  Each waiver granted by the federal government 
stems from “an iterative, negotiated process, in which the state holds 
a number of important cards.”199  In fact, states have the major ad-
vantage of being able to opt out of a federal program entirely if the 
federal government declines to negotiate or waive rules the states 
find objectionable.200  Thus, federal officials will be inclined to grant 
state waivers so that as much of cooperative programs as possible can 
be salvaged. 
There are, however, concerns over the desirability of this “waiver 
regime.”  First, there is a concern that the waivers will lead to a rise in 
“picket fence federalism.”201  Further, some liberal critics believe that 
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the waivers will lead to statutory erosion.202  There are, however, many 
advantages to this phenomenon of “federalism by waiver,” and de-
spite real concerns, the practical benefits of waivers are likely to out-
weigh the costs.203 
A. Criticisms 
The first concern stemming from a rise in waiver applications is 
that state officials with the power to negotiate waivers will not be “pol-
icy generalists” elected by state citizens, but rather expert-bureaucrats 
who specialize in relevant policy arenas, a phenomenon known as 
“picket fence federalism.”204  It has been suggested that this form of 
federalism is undesirable because of its potential to undermine 
“comprehensive, cross-program planning and budgeting”205 and “the 
power of [democratically] elected policy generalists . . . to control 
state and local government.”206  The fear is that waivers, such as the 
recently proposed § 1115 Medicaid waivers detailed above, could en-
courage the formation of alliances between “federal- and state-level 
subject-matter expert bureaucrats, who join together to overcome re-
sistance to a federal program’s goals from politicians207 and generalist 
agency officials at the state level.”208  Furthermore, many liberal critics 
of the waiver regime claim that the waivers have undermined, and 
will continue to, “undermine hard-won statutory requirements that 
would otherwise bind states to provide important services to less privi-
leged and empowered individuals and communities.”209  Critics argue 
further that states may attempt to use waivers to reduce spending on 
cooperative programs created to protect vulnerable populations dur-
 
state and federal agency experts within the same specialty—the ‘posts’ in the 
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county commissioners. Id. 
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ing recessions, “ the worst possible time, from a programmatic per-
spective, to cut aid to poor people.”210 
B. Benefits of “Federalism by Waiver” 
Despite such consequences, the overall effect of an increase in 
waiver grants will likely be positive.  First, with respect to “picket fence 
federalism,” the “benefits of [maintaining] elected generalists’ power, 
especially in the context of intergovernmental programs, are less self-
evident than the benefits with respect to comprehensive planning 
and budgeting.”211  There is clear value in having individuals who are 
highly knowledgeable and educated with respect to a particular poli-
cy area making decisions.  Further, the bureaucratic alliance can ac-
tually work to the advantage of political generalists.  This is because 
“subject-matter experts in the federal bureaucracy, supporting their 
allies in state government, can work to overcome the resistance of 
generalist federal officials to state-level innovations.”212  Further, the 
lack of available alternatives to the federalism by waiver framework 
could easily defeat the statutory erosion argument.213  If states are not 
given the option to apply for a waiver of federal spending conditions, 
a state may simply refuse compliance, as “[f]ederal agencies are un-
likely to terminate funding for relatively minor violations of the rules 
governing a spending program.”214  Alternatively, with more complex 
spending programs, such as Medicaid or the No Child Left Behind 
Act, states may decide to opt out of the program entirely.215  A clear 
waiver system provides a mechanism for federal agencies to engage 
states before they depart from the strict requirements of funding 
statutes, to negotiate for provisions that preserve the key goals—
as the administration sees it—of the statutes at issue, and to do so in a 
context that preserves a measure of public accountability.216 
Further, with the waiver process as a clear option, any disregard of 
governing rules will justify enforcement actions that might not be 
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triggered by the substance of a state’s violation in and of itself.217  
With Medicaid, for example, CMS has published detailed criteria for 
assessing waiver requests to provide states with advanced notice.218  
Another advantage of providing readily accessible criteria is that state 
and federal officials can more easily be held accountable for their de-
cisions.219  For complex spending programs, a “waiver regime can 
provide a safety valve that preserves conditional spending programs at 
the same time that it relieves states of some of the obligations im-
posed by them.”220  Thus, without waivers, statutory erosion would 
likely still occur and to a much greater degree as programs that bene-
fit the less privileged are completely extinguished. 
Finally, one of federalism by waiver’s greatest benefits is that it 
provides a powerful tool to negotiate a balance between national 
standards and local variation “but with lower stakes . . . than a regime 
that imposes strict statutory standards on states and provokes them to 
challenge those standards on constitutional grounds.”221  Such “ex-
perimentation” can lead to more effective and efficient programs at 
both the national and state level. 
CONCLUSION 
While some states may ultimately decide to expand their Medicaid 
programs, many remain in staunch opposition and are unlikely to 
provide health insurance to their low-income citizens according to 
the terms of the ACA.  For these states, negotiating a premium assis-
tance model through a § 1115 waiver may be a viable option, as com-
plete refusal to expand Medicaid or pursue an alternate program will 
mean the loss of substantial federal funding and will likely cause a net 
reduction in state budgets. 
The premium assistance model’s overall cost-effectiveness is pres-
ently unknown, since costs will be shaped in the short run and over 
the long term by factors such as “market rates in the exchanges—
which may decrease with competition for new enrollees—as well as 
Medicaid’s reimbursement rates—which may increase to convince 
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more providers to treat millions added to the program.”222  Further, 
since the federal government will be “footing the bill” for expanded 
state Medicaid programs during the first three years, it is unclear 
whether an expansion through the exchanges will cost the states 
more over the long term.  Any increase in costs associated with 
providing private insurance rather than expanding Medicaid is, 
however, very unlikely to cause more harm to state budgets than 
the complete loss of all federal funding associated with the refusal 
to participate in any form of “expansion.”  Thus, not only will the 
ACA’s goal of providing health insurance to all United States citi-
zens be thwarted, b u t  taxpayers in states refusing both the ACA’s 
Medicaid expansion and an alternate “expansion” through a § 1115 
waiver will likely suffer substantial adverse financial consequences 
in the long-term.  Pursuing some form of an “expansion” will, 
therefore, benefit both states and the federal government by fur-
thering the ACA’s objectives and generating funding states can use 
to provide health insurance coverage to low-income citizens while 
also improving state economies.    Finally, although an increase in 
waiver applications has the potential to alter the structure of feder-
alism as applied to joint federal and state programs, the overall ef-
fect of a rise in waiver activity is likely to be positive. 
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